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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------IN RE THE MATTER
OF

Case No. 16853

NELDA BOYER

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF OF STATE OF UTAH

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an order of the Second
·District Court in Weber County, finding the appellant to
be incapacitated and appointing a guardian over her person.
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the guardianship provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.

The state

as Amicus Curiae, herein defends the constitutionality of the
Utah Statutes.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Second Judicial District Court of Weber County,
the Honorable Judge Calvin Gould, presiding, after a jury trial,
found that appellant was an incapacitated person pursuant to
Section 75-1-201, Utah Code Annotated, and in need of a guardian.
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Appellants' sister, Susie Rice, was appointed .as guardian and is
presently serving in that capacity.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The State of Utah, as Amicus Curiae, seeks this court's
declaration that the guardianship provisions of the Utah Uniform
Probate Code are constitutional.
In the alternative, the state would suggest that this
case might appropriately be remanded if this court finds that
the judge below did not correctly apply the guardianship statutes
in this particular case.

/,

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state as Amicus Curiae is not an advocate for either
of the parties in this case.

It is not the state's purpose to

argue or discuss the particular facts of this case.

The court

should note, however, that due to lack of resources of the
guardian's family, no responsive brief has been or will be filed.
Therefore, the court's analysis of the specific facts of this
case and the lower court's application of the statute to those
facts will of necessity be assisted only by Appellant's Brief and
the record itself.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The interest

of the State of Utah as Amicus curiae in

this case is to defend the validity and constitutionality of
the guardianship provisions of the Utah Uniform Probate Code.
This brief is directed only to that issue and does not address
points raised.in Appelant's Brief which do not challenge the
statute itself.

_Specifically, Point VII of Appellant's Brief,

which discusses the expert witness testimony which was
accepted by the judge below, is not addressed or responded
to in the state's brief.

Neither does the state argue the

appropriateness or correctness of the lower court's application
of the guardianship statutes in this particular case.

However,

it should be pointed out that should this court find a misapplication of the statute by the lower court, it can avoid
any finding as to the constitutionality of the statute simply
by remanding with directions to make a different application
of the statute.This brief addresses appellant's arguments concerning
the constitutionality of the involuntary guardianship provisions
of the Utah Uniform Probate Code, Title 75, Utah Code Annotated,
1953 as amended, which was substantially adopted by the Utah
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State Legislature in 1975.

Appellant contends that the guardian-

ship provisions allow the state to deprive an individual of
important fundamental constitutional rights without sufficient
-due process and equal protection safeguards.
In any necessary guardianship there may be deprivation
of personal liberties.

However, the basic issue in this case

should not be whether any deprivation of personal rights because
of incapacity is ever warranted, but rather whether an individual
who has been deprived of some such

rig~ts

due to incapacity

has been afforded sufficient due process and equal protection
safeguards.

The adoption of the Utah Uniform Probate Code was

due in part to the recognition by the state legislature of the

potential infringement of civil rights by involuntary guardianships;:
and the need for procedural and substantive protections. In order
to comply with due process and equal protection requirements
necessitated because of the possible deprivation of fundamental
rights, the involuntary appointment of a guardian must be based
upon a compelling state interest, be the alternative least
restrictive of basic rights, afford sufficient procedural due
process, and be imposed under a sufficiently definitive statute.
By adoption of the Uniform Probate Code, Utah has ensured these
safeguards.

-4-
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POINT I
THE UTAH GUARDIANSHIP STATUTES DO NOT
UNCONSTITUTICNALLY DEPRIVE THE WARD OF
FUNDAMENTAL CIVIL RIGHTS.
By imposing involuntary guardianship upon an adult
person, the courts may deprive the incapacitated individual
of some rights enjoyed by others generally.

Basically, the

guardian has the _same control and custody of the incapacitated
person that a parent has of his unemancipated minor child.
Utah Code Annotated, Section 75-5-312.

Concededly, an appoint-

rnent of a guardian due to the incapacity of the ward, can
restrict an individual from exercising some fundamental civil
rights -- control over property, Section 75-5-312(b), choice of
place of abode, Section 75-5-312(a), personal choice of medical
care and treatment, Section 75-5-312(c).

Other freedoms which

may be limited are the right to marry, sue, contract, and
hold a license, Mental Health and Human Rights, Report of the·
Presidents' Commission on Mental Health, Ariz. L.R. 20:49-174,
77, 1978.

As these are basic rights protected by the Constitu-

tion, the state must have a strong interest in limiting their
exercise by some persons.

A.

INVOLUNTARY GUARDIANSHIPS, WHEN ORDERED
PURSUANT TO UTAH LAW, ARE JUSTIFIED BY
IMPORTANT AND COMPELLING STATE INTERESTS.

To prevent the detrimental physical and financial
consequences of incapacity has been unanimously determined by
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology
Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-5Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

every state legislature to be an important state interest
sufficient to warrant involuntary guardianship.

(For a list

of current guardianship statutes, see Mitchell, Involuntary
Guardianship,

Southern California Law Review, July 1979, Vol.

52, No. 5, footnote 35.)

Though the several states do not

have identical procedures for appointing guardians, and though
some may violate requirements of due process of law, the
unanimity does demonstrate the recognized need and importance
of involuntary guardians and conservators when warranted by
manifest disability.

So compelling in .fact is the interest of

the state in providing necessary guardianships that the Presidents'
Commission on Mental Heal th did not even question the legitimacy

ro:

of the imposition of guardianship if due process was ensured.

~

Mental Health and Human Rights, Arizona Law Review, 20:49-174,

j

19 7 8.

"'
The Utah statutes themselves express the reasons why

~

the state has such a great interest in the warranted appointment

~

of guardians.

~.

The "incapacitated person," according to Section

7 5-1-201, is one who "lacks sufficient understanding or capacity
to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his

co

person.:~

Thus, Section 75-5-304 states that "appointment is necessary and
desirable as a means of providing continuing care and supervision
of the person of the incapacitated person."

Section 75-5-312 state!i

that another reason for appointment of a guardian is to provide
for the comfort, maintenance, training, and education of the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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~

ward.

Section 75-5-401 states that an appointment of a con-

servator (the "guardian" of the ward's estate rather than the
ward's person) is to protect the estate of the ward from waste
or improvident dissipation, not only for the care of the ward but
also,when necessary or desirable,to provide for the care of those
entitled to be supported by the ward.

Section 75-5-402(c) recognizes

also a need to protect creditors of the ward by protective proceedings.
Another unexpressed, though logical, reason for involuntary guardianship is to protect the state and society from
undue welfare and tax burdens which would result from permitting
the person to continue making decisions regarding himself and
his estate which he is unquestionably incapable of making.

In

short, the justification of involuntary guardianship is needed
to ensure protection of the incapacitated person, his dependants,
and the state from the detrimental and legitimately avoidable
consequences of decisions which futilely risk physical and
financial ruin.
Guardianship is a consequence of living in a civilized
society.

Autonomy, even if it can be considered a fundamental

right, must bend,just as do guarded rights such as speech and
religion, when conduct or actions drop below a tolerable floor

-7Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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into behavior that is destructive of social good, familial
integrity and security, and one's own physical and financial
state.

There would seem to be no question that one who attempts

suicide is mentally aberrant and in need of help.
would not the state have an interest

Why then

in preventing eventual

physical or financial suicide when ones mental perspective
becomes so distorted that.he can no longer make responsible
decisions concerning himself and his affairs?

The conclusion

is that the state does have a compelling interest in appointing
guardians when warranted, which interest can only be questioned
when the appointment is a result of a violation of due process
or equal protection.

(See Points II, III, and IV, supra, for

a discussion of due process protections afforded by the Utah
statutes.)

B.

THERE IS NO NEED TO FIND A SUSPECT
CLASS AS STRICT SCRUTINY IS ALREADY
APPLIED TO THE GUARDIANSHIP PROCEEDINGS.

Petitioners argue that imposition of involuntary
guardianship creates a "suspect class" that invites strict
scrutiny of the Utah Uniform Probate Code provisions on
guardianship.

Since it is conceded that involuntary guardian-

ship may result in some restriction of basic rights, which
would invite the same standard of scrutiny, it is not necessary
to. argue whether involuntary wards are a suspect class.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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However,

it is important to note that the United States Supreme Court
has in recent years been slow to expand the classes considered
suspect.

It has retreated in extending "suspectness" to several

classes, including illegitimates.
762 (1977).

Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S.

The court has instead relied on newer equal pro-

tection analysis, which is a reasonably related test with bite.
This test requires "at a minimum, that a statutory classification
bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose."
Id. at 766.
Because the Utah involuntary guardianship statute can
pass even the strict scrutiny test, which requires a compelling
·state interest and least restrictive alternatives, there is no
question that the Utah statute is not rationally related to a
legitimate state purpose.

-9-
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POINT II
THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE PROVIDES
FOR AND REQUIRES THE MOST APPROPRIATE
GUARDIANSHIP OR ORDER WHICH LEAST
RESTRICTS THE EXERCISE OF FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHTS.
Because of the possible deprivation of rights which

•u

might result from an involuntary guardianship, due process not
only requires a compelling state interest, but also that any
infringements upon such rights be necessary and minimally
restrictive.

Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).

The

Utah Uniform Probate Code recognizes that incapacity can arise
from a number of causes and in variable degrees.
75-1-201.)

(Section

Consequently, any statute providing for involuntary

guardianship must be sufficiently flexible to allow the
courts to tailor the appointment or appropriate order to meet
the circumstances of each case and yet handle the spectrum
of cases ranging from minor to severe disability.
The Utah involuntary guardianship statutes are
constructed so as to meet both of these requirements.

In

regard to flexibility, the Utah statutes permit innumberable
alternatives, limited only be ingenuity itself.

The Utah

ti

court can appoint either a guardian or conservator or both
(See sections 75-5-303, 75-5-401, 75-5-410, and Editorial
Board Comment to 75-5-312.)

Alternatively, the court can

issue appropriate orders in lieu of guardianship, section

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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75-5-304, or enlarge or limit the statutorily defined powers
of the conservator, Section 75-5-426, or guardian, Section
75-5-312.

Section 75-5-408 lists permissible alternative

court orders as a result of protective proceedings, and
Section 75-5-409 even authorizes protective contracts, trusts,
or arrangments of single transactions.

In view of these

statutes it is apparent that any manner of guardianship
or limited guardianship can be fashioned and, perhaps more
importantly, avoided, since Section 75-5-304 permits appropriate
orders that could entail powers of attorney, trusts, provision
of home care or day care services, or whatever services are
available and appropriate.
The Utah statutes also bind the court to assess and
use the alternatives which least infringe upon the rights of
the indivicual.

Sections 75-5-304 and 75-5-401 state that

the court must

be satisfied that appointment (or any other

alternative which the court can order)
able .... "

is "necessary or desir-

The Utah statute therefore does not compel the

violation of basic rights as do statutes such as were addressed
in Shelton v. Tucker, supra, which arbitrarily violated the
rights of association by requiring full disclosure of associations.
Rather, the Utah guardianship statutes flexibly permit the tailoring
of appropriate orders or appointments and encourage the courts to
restrict the incapacitated person's rights only if necessary or

-11Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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desirable.

As the courts are bound to afford due process and

equal protection, which include the minimal restriction of
basic rights, the interpretation of the word "desirable" must
be limited by the bounds of constitutional law.

Furthermore,

those appointments or orders which are "necessary" are only those
which are minimally required to provide the incapacitated with
proper and effective care,and consequently result in guardianships which are least restrictive of the individual's rights.
It is also necessary to determine what is required
by the "least restrictive alternative" doctrine.

Most of

the case law regarding this issue concerns civil commitments,
but the underlying concern of safeguarding due process makes

I.

the courts'
case.

analys~s

in commitment cases appropriate in this

In the case of Lake v. Cameron, 364 F.2d 657 (D.C.

Cir. 1966), the court stated:

"Deprivation of liberty solely

because of dangers to the ill persons themselves should not
go beyond what is necessary for their protection."

Id. at 660.

To satisfy this obligation, the court held that commiting courts
have a duty to explore alternatives, which the state has the
burden of proposing, and to use earnest effort to provide care
reasonably suited to the individual's needs.
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617

Lake was cited in

(D.C. Cir. 1969),

concerned due process requirements after commitment.

-12-

which
That
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court's standard of review to determine whether a decision
conformed with the least restrictive alternative was whether
\
the court "made a permissible and reasonable decision in view
of the relevant information and within the broad range of discretion."

(419 F.2d at 621).

Perhaps the most lenient standard

that has been held to comport with the least restrictive
alternative requirement was expressed in Welsch v. Likins,
373 F.Supp. 487 (Minn. 1974), which stated that due process
requires state officials to make "good faith attempts to
place such persons in settings that will be suitable and
appropriate to their mental and physical conditions while
least restrictive of their liberties."

In light of these

cases it is apparent that the least restrictive alternative
requirement is not as strict as at first may be presumed.
(One explanation of this might be that expressed in Lake
that proceedings of care and treatment are not strictly
adversary proceedings.

Guardianship, a vestige of parens

patriae, is still considered as conferring a benefit,'which
historically did not require due process, rather than a taking
of a right.) The requirement seems to require only that the
court earnestly consider alternatives and choose that which
reasonably suits the individual's needs of proper and effective
care and least restricts fundamental rights.

The Utah standard

requiring that a guardianship appointment or order be that which

-13Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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is most "necessary or desirable" among the statutory alternatives,
ranging from dismissal of the petition to· full guardianship, fully
complies with and exceeds the requirements of the least restrictive
alternative doctrine.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization
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POINT III
THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
PROVIDES SUFFICIENT PROCEDURAL
SAFEGUARDS AND STANDARD OF PROOF
TO ENSURE DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL
PROTECTION OF THE LAW IN PROCEEDINGS
FOR INVOLUNTARY GUARDIANSHIP.
Another requirement of due process is sufficient
procedural safeguards when the deprivation of basic rights is
possible.

The factors in determining what is sufficient

were set forth in Mathews v .. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319

(1976),

which states:
[D]ue process generally requires
consideration of three factors:
first, the private interest that
will be affected by the official
action; second, the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such
interest through the procedures
used, and the probable value, if
any, of additional or substitute
safegu.ards; and finally, the
Government's interest, including
the function involved and the
fiscal and administrative burdens
that the additional or substitute
procedural requirements would entail.
424 U.S. at 335.
The Presidents Commission on Mental Heal th, Mental
Health and Human Rights, Arizona Law Review 20:49-174, 176, 1978,
listed by recommendation what due process required of guardianship proceedings:
4.

Guardianship

Recommendation 1.
(a)

State guardianship laws should
be revised to provide: (1) increased
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procedural protections including,
but not limited to, written and
oral notice, the right to be present at proceedings, appointment
of counsel and a clear and convincing evidence standard as the
burden of proof; a comprehensive
evaluation of functional abilities
conducted by trained personnel;
and a judicial hearing which
employs those procedural standards
used in civil actions in the courts
of general jurisdiction of any
given State; (2) a definition of
incompetency which is understandable,
specific and relates to functionai
abilities of people; (3) the exercise
of guardians' powers within the
constraints of the right to least
restrictive setting, with no change
made in a person's physical environment without a very specific showing
of need to remove a person to a
more restrictive setting; and (4)
a system of limited guardianships
in which rights are removed and
supervision provided only for those
activities in which the person has
demonstrated an incapacity to act
independently.
(b)

Public guardianship statutes should
be reviewed for their effect in
providing services to persons in
need of but without guardianship.

Utah, as well as other states who have adopted the
Uniform Probate Code, has

replaced the former informal and

constitutionally questionable guardianship proceedings with
substantive and procedural formalities that ensure procedural
due process as outlined by the President's Commission.

Utah

Code Annotated, Sections 75-1-401, 75-5-309, and 75-5-405 require
that personal notice be served 10 days prior to the hearing;
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-16-

Section 75-5-303 ensures the individual's right to be present,
to confront all witnesses, to present evidence, to counsel, to
cross-examine witnesses, and to a jury; Section 75-5-307 ensures
the right to petition for termination of incapacity; and Section
75-1-308 ensures the right to appeal.

The only procedural

safeguard alleged by the appellant to be insufficient is the
standard of proof.
The Utah standard of proof goes to two issues whether the individual is incapacitated and whether the
final appointment or order is necessary or desirable.
The standard of proof required by the Utah Uniform
Probate Code is that the court must be ''satisfied that the
person for whom a guardian is sought is incapacitated and that
the appointment is necessary or desirable .... "

Section 75-5-304.

The apparent problem with this standard is determining where it
falls within the traditionally known standards of preponderance,
clear and convincing, or beyond a reasonable doubt.

However,

the problem disappears for two reasons.
First, as stated in Point II, guardianship is a vestige
of the doctrine of parens patriae.

Before the acute awareness

and protection of due process and fundamental rights, the
normal guardianship proceeding was informal and afforded few
procedural safeguards.

The justification of this was that the

proceeding was to benefit the individual rather than to injure
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him or deprive him of any rights.

As the need to prevent the

unnecessary deprivation of rights appropriately received
measured concern, there was also recognized the need to preserve the benefits of the informal proceeding.

These benefits

included efficiency, confidentiality, minimal advocacy that
pr~vented

additional trauma and alienation of the allegedly

already troubled patient, and informality itself.

As the court

in Lake, supra, noted, the guardianship proceeding is still not
a strictly adversary proceeding.

Rather it is a proceeding to

determine what action is in the best interest of the individual.
The courts are permitted to choose the most reasonable alternative
in light of what is necessary for the proper and effective care
of the individual and is minimally restrictive of his rights.
A standard which traditionally pertains to and reflects the
adversarial nature seems in part inappropriate to a proceeding
which is not strictly adversarial.
that recognizes the

For this reason a standard

balance between the adversarial and bene-

f icial natures of the guardianship proceeding is most
appropriate.

The standard of "satisfaction" seems to reflect

such balance.
Second, to calm the fears of whimsy foreseen in the
term "satisfied", Utah case law has given some substance to
the word.
606

The case of Abbott v. Peter, 105 Ut. 499, 143 P.2d

(1943), which concerned the standard to prove mistake in

contract, stated that the standard was equal to that necessary
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to prove fraud, which was clear, convincing and satisfying.
(See also Hobart v. Hobart, 26 Cal.2d 412, 159 P.2d 958 (1945)).
It is clear from this court's discussion in Abbott, supra,
that the word "satisfaction" is equated with the standard
of clear and convincing evidence.

"Satisfaction" requires

more than a mere preponderance of the evidence or probability,
and less than that required to prove a fact
doubt."

'~beyond

a reasonable

The clear and convincing standard is what is demanded

by Appellant in the present case (See Point VI, Appellant's
Brief) .
It appears that the judge in the lower court may not
have directed the jury in this case to apply the clear and
convincing test.

If this court determines that to be the

required standard, the case might appropriately be reversed
or remanded on that point.

Such an action, however, would not

necessitate a finding that the statute itself is invalid.
Rather, the finding would be that the Utah statute requires
clear and convincing proof and was simply erroneously interpreted or applied by the judge below.

The State would suggest

however, that the court carefully review the record in this
matter, as it appears that the evidence produced was sufficient
to meet even the more demanding test of clear and convincing
proof.
For a time there appeared to be some disagreement
among authorities as to whether the standard of proof in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-19-

guardianship cases should be the more strict "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard.
397 U.S. 358

The case of In re Winship,

(1970) is cited by proponents of the stricter

standard because the Supreme Court in that case applied the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard in a juvenile case, which
is considered a civil proceeding.

However, the Winship

court said that this was a "single narrow issue whether proof.
beyond a reasonable doubt is among the 'essentials of due
process ... ' during the adjudicatory stage when a juvenile
is charged with an action which would constitute a crime if
committed by an adult."

397 U.S. at 359.

The case therefore

is applicable only in the narrow context of criminal or quasicriminal proceedings.
Other courts which applied the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard to civil commitment proceedings were In re
Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973); and Lessard v. Schmidt,
349 F.Supp. 1978 (E.D. Wisc. 1972), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 414 U.S. 472

(1974).

It should also be noted

that Utah Code Annotated, Section 64-7-10, requires the beyond
a reasonable doubt standard for involuntary commitments.
However, in a unanimous decision, the United States
Supreme Court held in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418

(1979),

that the standard of proof constitutionally required for civil
commitment is clear and convincing evidence.

The Addington

case is controlling on this point and effectively overrules
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Lessard, supra, and other earlier cases which purported to
require a beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
The discussion in French v. Blackburn, 428 F.Supp.
1351 (M.D.N.C. 1977), affirmed 443 U.S. 901 (1979), is helpful
in distinguishing the cases that urged the reasonable doubt
standard.

That court recognized that the sole purpose of the

commitment proceeding was not deprivation of .liberty, but
rather to aid and treat incapacitated individuals.

The court

also said that the issues in a commitment proceeding, by
their very nature, are not .susceptible of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt and that such a standard would be an
impossible burden and prevent the aid to those in actual need.
Id. at 1360.
The 1978 President's Commission on Mental Health also
recommended use of the clear and convincing standard as a
sufficient due process safeguard.

Mental Health and Human

Rights, Arizona Law Review, 20:49-174, 76 1978.
In view of recent case law and authority, the clear
and convincing standard fully complies with due process
requirements.

Furthermore, in view of this authority and Utah

statutes, the clear and convincing standard is also the most
desirable since it recognizes the beneficial and protective
nature of the proceedings, yet also protect the individual's
rights to due process and equal protection.
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Therefore, the Utah Uniform Probate Code does provide
sufficient procedural formalities to protect the incapacitated
person's right to procedural due process.

Furthermore, the

Utah standard of proof requiring the court to be satisfied
that the person is incapacitated and that the guardianship
appointment is necessary or desirable requires more than a
mere preponderance of evidence but less than required by the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard.

This "satisfaction"

standard is equivalent to the clear and convincing standard
which has been held by the United States Supreme Court to
satisfy the requirements of due process.
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POINT IV
THE UTAH UNIFORM PROBATE CODE
SUFFICIENTLY DEFINES "INCAPACITATED"
SO AS TO GIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE TO THE
COURT AND INDIVIDUAL.
Finally, appellant argues that the Utah definition
of "incapacitated" is vague and overbroad.

Allegedly, the

definition is so vague as to give no notice to the individual
or the court as to what standard his conduct will be compared
with to determine incapacity.
The definition in question is found .in Section 751-201(18), Utah Code Annotated, which provides as follows:
"Incapacitated person" means any
person who is impaired by reason of
mental illness, mental deficiency,
physical illness or disability,
advanced age, chronic use of drugs,
chronic intoxication, or other cause
(except minority) to the extent that
he lacks sufficient understanding or
capacity to make or communicate
responsible decisions concerning his
person.
First, the Utah standard of incapacity is not vague
or overbroad.

The Utah definition essentially is that an

incapacitated person is any person who is impaired to the
extent that he lacks sufficient understanding or capacity
to make or communicate responsible decisions concerning his
person, for whatever cause besides minority.

The statute

lists a number of causes, including mental illness and
deficiency or any other. This list of causes seems to add

-23-
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some insight into what the legislature foresaw as causing
incapacity.

However, this list obviously was not considered

a meticulous and exclusive list of grounds for finding incapacity,
since the focus of the statute is upon the resulting effect
or impairment rather than upon the cause

i~self.

It is also

difficult to understand how one could require the legislature
to define in detail terms that even the mental health
concede are not yet

comprehensively definable.

scienti~ts

Symposium -

Mentally Retarded People and the Law, Stanford Law Review, Vol.
31, p. 555, April, 1979.
Second, the substantive and procedural statutes
concerning involuntary guardianship add specificity to the
definition of incapacity.

The statutes as discussed above

in Point III recognize the different causes and levels of
incapacity and correspondingly create flexible procedures
and altenatives so that the court might tailor the order
or appointment to the needs of the individual while ensuring
minimal infringement upon the exercise of his rights.

The

statutes are not overbroad because the courts are authorized
to impose guardianship upon an individual only to the extent
that the court is satisfied that the individual is incapacitated
and that the appointment or order is necessary or desirable.
Third, the Utah Uniform Probate Code defines in
detail what are considered "responsible decisions concerning
his person."

Section 75-5-312,which outlines the general
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powers and duties of the guardian, and Section 75-5-4, which
outlines the duties of a conservator, obviously contain the
lists of those decisions which the legislature intended as
"responsible".

These decisions include the protection of the

person of the incapacitated, his abode, maintenance, education,
training and health - and protection of the estate of the ward
for the benefit of himself, his dependents, creditors, and the
state.

The Utah Uniform Probate Code permits the court to

limit or expand the duties and powers of the guardian or to
issue other appropriate orders in orde·r to allow the guardian
to make only those decisions which the individual is incapable
of making for himself.
Fourth, the United States Supreme Court has held
that a statute need not be mathematically precise.

In the

case of Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 108, 110 (1972), which
addressed the allegation that a city anti-noise ordinance was
too vague and broad, the court said, "[W]e can never expect
mathematical certainty from our language.

The words of the

Rockford ordinance are marked by 'flexibility and reasonable
breadth, rather than meticulous specificity'".
this Point and Point I,

As noted in

the purpose of the Utah statute is

to provide this necessary flexibility and breadth in order to
comply with due process.
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Finally, the individual is protected from any possible
vagueness in definition by the requirement that the judge must
be presented with clear and convincing evidence of the alleged
incapacity (See Point III, supra).

This is a demanding

standard which is necessitated by the inherent inprecision of
mental health definitions and determinations.

Because of the

standard of proof required by the statute, the ward is protected
from haphazard or overbroad applications of the guardianship
statute.
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CONCLUSION
The Utah Uniform Probate Code provides the necessary
flexibility and procedural safeguards to ensure due process
and equal protection of the laws during and following proceedings
for the ap~ointment of a guardian.

Therefore, the State of

Utah, as amicus curiae, respectfully requests this court to
uphold the guardianship statutes as constitutional.
Dated this 4th day of June, 19 80.
ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney General
SHARON PEACOCK
Assistant Attorney General
Amicus Curiae
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